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108 BIEWEND v. BIEWEND. [17 C. (2d) 
[Sac. No. 5405. In Bank.-January 28, 1941.] 
LOTTIE C. BIEWE;ND, Respondent, v. ADOLPH C. BIE-
WEND, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce and Separation - Foreign Divorces - Judgment for 
Alimony-Accrued InstaIIments.-An order for the payment 
of money as alimony rendered by a court cif competent juris-
diction in one state must be recognized by all other states un-
der the full faith and credit clause as to all accrued install-
ments not subject to modification by the court rendering the 
original order. Only if such accrued payments are still sub-
ject to modification may recovery be denied. 
[2] Judgments-Sister State, etc., Judgments-Sister State Judg-
ments-Full Faith and Credit-Judgment on Cause of Action 
Against Public PolicY.-A valid judgment must be accorded 
full faith and credit by every other court in the United States 
even though the cause of action upon which the judgment was 
based is against the law and public policy of the state in 
which enforcement is sought. 
[3] Divorce and Separation - Foreign Divorces - Judgment for 
Alimony-Accrued Installments-Effect of Subsequent Events. 
A judgment of another state for alimony must be accorded~ 
full faith and credit as to accrued alimony notwithstanding 
the subsequent marriage of the wife to another, her later re-
sumption of marital relations with the defendant, and the 
coming of age of the children of the marriage, where these 
facts do not, under the law of the state where the judgment 
was rendered, release the defendant from the obligation to pay 
alimony. And this is true despite the fact that the California 
rule may be otherwise. 
[4] ld.-Foreign Divorces-Judgments for Alimony-Future Pay-
ments.-The full faith and credit clause does not obligate 
the courts of one state to enforce an alimony decree rendered 
in another state with regard to future payments, particularly 
when such future installments are subject to modification by 
the court of original jurisdiction. Such enforcement may, 
however, be given on the basis of comity. 
[5] ld.-Foreign Divorces - Judgment for Alimony-Establish-
ment as Decree of California Court-Limitation on Rule.-The 
5. See 5 Cal. Jur. 422; 11 Am. Jur. 300. 
McK. Dig. References: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6. Divorce and Separation, 
§ 305; 2. Judgments, § 474; 7, 8. Limitation of Actions, § 16; 
9. Limitation of Actions, § 143; 10. Appeal and Error, § 1158. 
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rule of comity by which a sister state judgment for future 
payments of alimony may be established as a decree of a 
California Court is subject to the principle that foreign laws 
will not be given effect contrary to the settled public policy 
of the forum. But to bring a case within the limitation of the 
rule it must be clear that the enforcement of the right ob-
tained under the laws of another state would be prejudicial 
to recognized standards of morality and to the general in-
terest of the citizens in the state of the forum. A mere 
variance between these laws does not warrant denial of en-forcement. 
Id. - Foreign DivorceS-Judgment for AlimonY-Establish_ 
ment as Decree of California Court-Effect of Marriage and 
Coming of Age of Children.-A sister state judgment for 
future payments of alimony may be established as a decree 
of a California Court under the rule of comity, notwithstand_ 
ing the Subsequent remarriage of the parties, and the coming 
of age of the children, where under the law of the state in 
which the judgment was rendered, tIle obligation of the de-
fendant is not released thereby. The California court judg-
ment ordering such payment is enforceable until such time as 
the original decree is modified. 
Limitation of Actions-Limitation Laws and Agreements_ 
ApplicabilitY-Law Governing.-The barring of a claim, in-
cluding a judgment, by the statute of limitations is a pro-
cedural matter governed by the law of the forum, regardless 
of where the cause of action arose. 
[8] Id.-Limitation Laws and Agreements _ ApplicabilitY_Law 
Governing-Application of Statutes.-Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 361, declaring that an action shall not be maintained 
against a perSOn upon a cause of action which arose in an-
other state upon which by the laws thereof an action cannot 
be maintained against him by reason of the lapse of time, 
except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state 
and who held the cause of action from the time it accrued, 
applies only to causes of action barred by the law of the state 
of creation, but not by the law of this state. 
(9] Id.-Procedure-Pleading-Answer_Pleading by Reference to 
Code Sections.-In an action on a foreign judgment for ali-
mony, brought after the running of the limitations statute 
of the state of its rendition by a plaintiff who had not 
been a citizen of this state from the time the cause of action 
accrued, the defendant properly pleaded the statute of limita-
tions when he aUeged in his answer that the plaintiff's cause 
of action "is barred by the provision of section 361 of the 
8. See 5 Cal. Jur. 433 i II Am. Jur. 50S. 
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Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California." (See 
Code Civ. Proc., sec. 458.) 
[10] Appeal and Error - Review-Presumptions-Sufficiency of 
Evidence-Applications of Rule-Defenses-Bar of Statute of 
Limitations.-On an appeal on a judgment roll alone, it will 
be presumed, that a finding that a sister state judgment for 
alimony was not barred by Code of Civil Procedure, section 
361, was supported by the evidence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Joaquin County. C. W. Miller, Judge. Affirmed. 
Gumpert &·Mazzera and C. H. Hogan for Appellant. 
Nathan H. Snyder, Lawrence Edwards and Chas. H. Ep-
person for' RespondE)nt. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff secured a decree of divorce in 
Missouri on May 10, 1918, which provided that defendant 
pay her $25 per week for the support of herself and their 
four minor children. Both parties were before the court 
and subject to its jurisdiction. Subsequently they came to 
California., Between the date of the original divorce decree 
in Missouri and the time of bringing this action all the 
minor children reached their majority. Meanwhile plaintiff .:.! 
married and divorced a second time after which she again 
lived with defendant for a period of four years. In 1938, 
the plaintiff brought suit upon the decree in the Superior 
Court of San Joaquin County, and recovered a judgment 
ordering not only the payment of those installments which 
had accrued within five years prior to the beginning of the 
action but also payment to her of $25 per week from the 
date of the judgment. Defendant has appealed from this 
judgment. 
[1] An order for the payment of money as alimony ren-
dered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one state must 
be recognized by aU other states under the full faith and 
credit clause of the United States Constitution as to all ac-
crued installments not subject to modification by the court 
rendering the original order. (Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 
[30 Sup. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905] ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 
183 [21 Sup. (;t: 555, 45 L. Ed. 810]; Barber v. Barber, 
62 U. S. (21 How.) 582 [16 L. Ea. ~36~ ; Goodrich, Conflict 
10. See 12 Cal. Jur. 877; 16 Cal. Jur. 626; 3 Am. Jur. 506; 1:: 
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of Laws [2d ed.], sec. 135; A. L. I. Restatement, Conflicts of 
Laws, sec. 464; Barns v. Barns, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 427 [50 Pac. 
(2d) 463]; Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48 [59 Pac. (2d) 
953, 106 A. L. R. 580] ; Thomas v. Thomas, 14 Cal. (2d) 355 
[94 Pac. (2d) 810]; Spalding v. Spalding, 75 Cal. App. 569 
[243 Pac. 445] ; Rinkenberger v. Rinkenberger, 99 Cal. App. 
45 [277 Pac. 1096]; Mercantile Acceptance 00. v. Frank, 
203 Cal. 483 [265 Pac. 190, 57 A. L. R. 696] ; Palen v. Palen, 
12 Cal. App. (2d) 357 [55 Pac. (2d) 228]; Oreager v. Su-
perior Oourt, 126 Cal. App. 280 [14 Pac. (2d) 552] ; Dreesen 
v. Dreesen, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 479 [88 Pac. (2d) 223] ; Hand-
schy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac. (2d) 
123] ; Oummings v. Oummings, 97 Cal. App. 144 [275 Pac. 
245] ; Morrow v. Morrow, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 474 [105 Pac. 
(2d) 129].) 
Only if such accrued payments are still subject to modi-
fication may recovery be denied. (Bentley v. Oalabrese, 155 
Misc. 843 [280 N. Y. Supp. 454]; Weston v. Weston, 177 
La. 305 [148 So. 241] ; Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85 [75 N. E. 
92; 4 Ann. Cas. 296] ; Bleuer v. Bleuer, 27 Oklo 25 [110 Pac. 
736] ; Levine v. Levine, 95 Or. 94 [187 Pac. 609]; Hunt V. 
Monroe, 32 Utah, 428 [91 Pac. 269, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 249] ; 
Henry V. Henry, 74 W. Va. 563 [82 S. E. 522, L. R. A. 
1916D, 1024].) 
Under the law of Missouri courts of that state will make 
no modification of the right to accrued installments. The 
wife thus has a vested right to them enforceable in other 
states on the basis of full faith and credit. (Nelson v. Nel-
son, 282 Mo. 412 [221 S. W. 1066].) Neither the subsequent 
marriage of the divorced wife to another nor her subsequent 
resumption of marital relations with the defendant nor the 
coming of age of the children automatically releases the de-
fendant from his obligations to pay alimony. They merely 
afford grounds for the court in its discretion to modify or 
vacate the order as to future installments upon proper ap-
plication. (Niedt v. Niedt, (Mo. App.) 95 S. W. (2d) 868.) 
Section 1355 of Revised Missouri Statutes [1929], volume I, 
page 567, provides that the court may modify the order for 
payment of alimony but only Upon application of either of 
the parties. 
[2] It is well settled that once a valid judgment has been 
rendered it must be accorded full faith and credit by every 
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of action upon which the judgment was based is against the 
law and public policy of the state in which enforcement is 
sought. (Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 [28 Sup. Ct. 
641, 52 L. Ed. 1039]; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 
[48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed. 365]; Milwaukee County v. 
M. E. White Company, 296 U. S. 268 [56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 
L. Ed. 220]; Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago, 
280 Fed. 525 [51 App. D. C. 394]; Westwater v. Murray, 
245 Fed. 427 [157 C. C. A. 589] ; Morrow v. Morrow, supraj 
24 A. L. R. 1437 j Goodrich, Conflict of Laws [2d ed.], sec. 
207.) [3] In the present case the provision of the Califor-
nia law that a divorced wife is no longer entitled to alimony 
after she has remarried (Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 139 j Cohen 
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99 [88 Pac. 267, 11 Ann. Cas. 520] j 
Tremper v. Tremper, 39 Cal. App. 62 [177 Pac. 868] j Atlass 
v. Atlass, 112 Cal. App. 514 [297 Pac. 53] j McClure v. Mc-
Clure,4 Cal. (2d) 356 [49 Pac. (2d) 584, 100 A. L. R. 12571 j 
Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 661 [45 Pac. (2d) 246]) or 
the 'rule that a court may reduce alimony payments upon the 
coming of age of the minor children (Hale v. Hale, supra) 
can in no way diminish the obligation of the California 
court to give full faith and credit to the Missouri decree with 
regard to accrued installments of alimony. .} 
[4] The full faith and credit clause, however, does not 
obligate the courts of one state to enforce an alimony 
decree rendered in another state with regard to future pay-
ments, particularly when such future installments are sub-
ject to modification by the court of original jurisdiction. 
(Sistare v. Sistare, supraj Lynde v. Lynde, supraj Barber 
v. Barber, supraj Cummings v. Cwmmings, 97 Cal. App. 144 
[275 Pac. 245] ; Creager v. Superior Court, supraj Rinkenber-
ger v. Rinkenberger, supraj Barns v. Barns, supraj McCul-
lough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288 [168 N. W. 929] j Levy 
v. Dockendorff, 177 App. Div. 249 [163 N. Y. Supp. 435]; 
Richardsv. Richards, 87 Misc. 134 [149 N. Y. Supp. 1028] ; 
Ca'mpbell v. Campbell, 28 Okl. 838 [115 Pac. 11111; Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 117 Ohio, 558 [160 N. E. 34, 57 A. L. R. 
11081; Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49 [135 Atl. 840] ; 
McWilliams v. McWilliams, 216 Ala. 16 [112 So. 318] ; Freund 
v. Freund, 71 N. J. Eq. 524 [63 Atl. 756] ; Reik v. Reik, 101 
N. J. Eq. 523 [139 Atl. 385] ; A. L. 1., Rest. Conflicts of Laws, 
sec. 464.) In the present case the Missouri court clearly re-
tains authority to modify the amount of future installments 
1 
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not yet due upon proper application showing good cause by 
the defendant (Sec. 1355, Revised Missouri Statutes [1929], 
vol. I, p. 567; Niedt v. Niedt, (Mo. App.) 104 S. w. (2d) 
692; Meyers v. ],!eyers, 91 Mo. App. 151.) 
Upon the basis of comity, however, as distinguished from 
the requirements of full faith and credit, the California courts 
have in numerous cases ordered that a foreign decree for 
future payments of alimony be established as the decree of 
the California court with the same force and effect as if 
it had been entered in this state, including punishment for 
contempt if the defendant fails to comply. (Palen v; Palen, 
12 Cal. App. (2d) 357 [55 Pac. (2d) 228]; Creager v. Su-
perior Court, supraj Straus v. Straus, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 461 
[41 Pac. (2d) 218, 42 Pac. (2d) 378]; Cummings v. Cum-
mings, Supraj Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. (2d) 48 [59 Pac. (2d) 
953, 106 A. L. R. 580] ; see, also, Morrow v. Morrow, supra.) 
[5] Such a rule of comity is subject to the principle that 
foreign laws will not be given effect when contrary to the 
settled public policy of the forum. (Estate of Lathrop, 165 
Cal. 243 [131 Pac. 752]; Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192 
[38 Pac. 636]; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532 [31 Pac. 915, 
19 L. R. A. 40] ; Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120; Pennoyer 
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [24 L. Ed. 565] ; Green v. Van Buskirk, 
72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 307 [18 L. Ed. 599] ; Smith v. Union Bank, 
30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 518 [8 L. Ed. 212] ; 5 Cal. Jur. 422; 12 
C. J. 439.) It must be clear, however, that the enforcement 
of the right obtained under the laws of another state would 
be prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to 
the general interests of the citizens in the state of the forum. 
(Dennick v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J., 103 U. S. 11 [26 
L. Ed. 439]; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 
Minn. 11 [16 N. W. 413,47 Am. Rep. 771] ; Powell v. Great 
Northern Ry. Co., 102 Minn. 448 [113 N. W. 1017] ; Loucks 
v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99 [120 N. E. 198] ; 
Internationa,l Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114 [124 
N. W. 1042, 20 Ann. Cat3. 614, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 774]; 
Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192 [38 Pac. 636]; 5 Cal. Jur. 
423; 12 C. J. 439.) Actually as set forth in the Restate-
ment: "There is a strong public policy favoring the en-
forcement of duties validly created by the law governing 
their creation. Denial of enforcement of the foreign claim 
will result in an undeserved benefit to the defendant." 
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Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights 
[1918],27 Yale L. J. 656.) A mere variance between the law 
of the forum and the law of the state where the cause arose 
does not alone warrant such denial of enforcement. (Den-
nick v. Oentral R. R.Oo. of N. J., supra; Herrick v. Minne-
apolis & St. L. Ry. 00., supra; Powell v. Great Northern 
Ry. 00., supra; Loucks v. Standard Oil 00. of N. Y., supra; 
International Harvester 00. v. McAdam, supra; Whitney 
v. Dodge, supra; 5 Cal. Jur. 423; 12 C. J. 439.) 
[6] In the present case the Missouri law differs from that 
of California in permitting alimony payments to continue 
after the remarriage of the divorced wife. (Gunderson v. 
Gunderson, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 257 [40 Pac. (2d) 956].) 
Such a right to receive future installments of alimony, how-
ever, even though at variance with Civil Code, section 139, 
is not perforce inharmonious with local public policy. It 
offers no threat to either the moral standards or the general 
interests of the citizens of this state. To hold that the right 
created in Missouri is so immoral as to be unenforceable 
here would involve a complacent attribution of moral su-
periority to this state. The remarriage and the coming of 
age of the minor children offer grounds for modification of 
the original decree for which the defendant can make appli- ~ 
cation in the court of original jurisdiction in Missouri, and 
it is not incumbent upon the California court to refuse to 
give prospective effect to the decree upon these grounds. 
(Handschy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac. 
(2d) 123].) Therefore, the judgment of the trial court 
ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $25 per week 
in the future from the date of the judgment is valid and 
enforceable· until such ti~e as the Missouri court modifies 
its decre!'!. 
[7] It is a principle of conflict of laws recognized in 
California that the barring of a claim by the statute of limi-
tations is a procedural matter governed by the law of the 
forum, regardless of where the cause of action arose. (Me-
Elmoyle v. Oohen, 38 U. S. [13 Pet.] 312 [10 L. Ed. 177] ; 
Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U. S. [9 How.] 407 [13 L. Ed. 
194] ; Royal Trust 00. v. MacBean, 168 Cal. 642 [144 Pac. 
139] ; Miller v. Lane, 160 Cal. 90 [116 Pac. 58].) It is a 
corollary that an action brought upon a judgment of a sister 
state is subject to the limitations prescribed by thE! law of 
,. 
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the state where the action is brought. (Stewart v. Spaulding, 
72 Cal. 264 [13 Pac. 661] ; 3 Freeman, Judgments, sec. 1456.) 
Section 336 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that an action upon a judgment or decree of any 
court of the United States or of any state within the United 
States must be brought within five years. A decree for fu-
ture payments of alimony is a continuing judgment. The 
trial court in this case therefore gave judgment for those in-
stallments of alimony which had accrued within five years 
prior to the bringing of the action, the California statute 
of limitations having run on all installments accruing prior 
to that time. 
[8] Section 361 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
however, provides: "When a cause of action has arisen in 
another state, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof 
an action thereon cannot there be maintained against a per-
son by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall 
not be maintained against him in this state, ex·cept in favor 
of one who has been a citizen of this state, and who held 
the cause of action from the time it accrued." This section 
applies only to causes of action barred by the law of the 
state of creation, but not by the law of this state. (Little-
page v. Morek, 120 Cal. App. 88 [7 Pac. (2d) 716].) Since 
the plaintiff has not been a citizen of this state from the 
time the cause of action accrued, this section has the effect 
of applying the Missouri statute of limitations to those in-
stallments accruing within five years, upon which the Cali-
fornia statute of limitations has not run. (Stewart v. Spaul-
ding, 72 Cal. 264 [13 Pac. 661] ; Van Buskirk v. Kuhns, 164 
Cal. 472 [129 Pac. 587, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 932, 44 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 710].) 
Defendant therefore sets up as a bar to this action sec-
tion 886 of the Revised Missouri Statutes of 1929, in force 
at the time the original alimony decree was secured by plain-
tiff, which provides: "Every judgment, order or decree of 
any court of record of the United States, or of this Or any 
other state, territory or county, shall be presumed to be 
paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from 
the date of the original rendition thereof, or if the same has 
been revived upon personal service duly had upon the de-
fendant or defendants therein, then after ten years from 
and after such revival, or in case a payment has been made 
on such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon 
" 
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the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from 
the last payment so made, and after the expiration of ten 
years from the date of the original rendition or revival upon 
personal service, or from the date of the last payment, such 
judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no 
execution, order or process issued thereon, nor shall any 
suit be brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose 
whatever. " 
This section has been held effective to cut off the right 
to continuing alimony installments if no payment is made 
or action' taken upon the original decree within ten years 
after rendition. (Mayes v. Mayes, 342 Mo. 401 [116 S. W. 
(2d) 1].) It has been interpreted, however, by the Missouri 
courts as constituting a statute of limitations which must 
be specially pleaded to be available in defense to an action 
on a judgment. (Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Smith, 
(Mo. App.) 17 S. W. (2d) 378; Flink v. Parcell, 344 Mo. 
49 [124 S. W. (2d) 1189].) 
[9] Defendant properly pleaded his contention under 
California law when he alleged by answer that plaintiff's 
cause of action "is barred by the provisions of Section 361 
of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California." ~ 
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 458; Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, 
157 Cal. 192, 193, 198 [106 Pac. 715, 21 Ann. Cas. 1279].) 
The trial court, however, eX'Pressly found that" it is not true 
that .said judgment is barred by Section 361 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure of the State of California." [10] Defend-
ant 'has appealed upon the judgment roll alone. He has 
made no showing on appeal that any evidence was introduced 
below to sustain his burden of proving that the cause of 
action was barred by the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. 
Proc., sec. 458; First National Bank v. Armstrong, 110 Cal. 
App. 408 [294 Pac. 25]; 16 Cal. Jur. 626.) He has not 
shown that plaintiff failed to take some action upon the 
original decree within ten years after its rendition. Every 
intendment favors the validity of the judgment as rendered, 
and if no evidence is presented in the record on appeal, 
it must be assumed that sufficient evidence was presented 
to the trial court to sustain its finding of fact. (Morris v. 
Board of Education, 119 Cal. App. 750 [7 Pac. (2d) 364, 
8 Pac. (2d) 502]; Archer v. Harvey, 164 Cal. 274 [128 Pac. 
410].) Defendant's contention that the action is barred by 
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section 361 of the Code of Civil Procedure therefore cannot 
be sustained. 
The jUdgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Peters, J., pro tem., Ward, J., 
pro tem., and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
I concur' in that portion of the majority opmIOn which 
holds that the judgment should be affirmed as to those ali-
mony payments which had accrued under the Missouri de-
cree within five years immediately preceding the commence-
ment of this action, but I dissent from that portion of said 
opinion which purports to affirm that portion of the judg-
ment of the trial court establishing the Missouri decree as a 
California judgment requiring payments henceforth of $25 
per week by the husband to the wife although the Missouri 
award was for the support of both the children and the wife, 
and the children have now reached majority, and the wife, 
since the Missouri decree, has remarried. It is true that the 
second marriage has been dissolved, but when we consider 
that the wife has done nothing to enforce the Missouri decree 
.from the time of its entry until 1938, and during that time 
has lived with the husband for four years and has been 
married and divo:~ced a second time, considerations of good 
morals, social principles, natural justice, and fair play re-
quire a determination that it is against the public policy 
of this state to establish the Missouri decree as a California 
judgment requiring the husband in the future to pay $25 
per week to the wife. It must be conceded that whether or 
not future payments under the Missouri decree shall be 
so established, lies entirely in the discretion of the trial court, 
unaffected by the full faith and credit clause of the federal 
Constitution; but it is contended that such establishment is 
not against the public policy of this state as expressed by 
the legislature in section 139 of the Civil Code, which pro-
vides that alimony payments shall cease upon remarriage 
of the wife. The term "public policy" as used in connection 
with the enforcement by one state of another state's laws 
is at best vague and impossible of precise definition, and it 
is true that a state's public policy ordinarily is not violated 
merely because there is a variance in the laws of the states 
involved, and that before there is such a violation of the law 
I 
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of the other state, it must be contrary to good morals or 
natural justice. But in this instance we have a declaration 
of policy in California which states that a woman cannot 
look to her former divorced husband for support and main-
tenance after she has become the wife of another man. It 
is undoubtedly a fundamental social principle inherent in 
the fiber of any flourishing and successful social order, that 
marriage, and the home life and families that flow there-
from, are to be fostered and encouraged at all times. The 
law that relieves a man from further alimony payments after 
his divorced wife remarries, not only encourages a man to 
remarry and establish a home and rear a family because he 
is relieved of the burden of supporting his first wife, but 
in the majority of instances will make his remarriage a 
possibility j whereas, due to economic circumstances, it would 
be out of the question~ if he has a former wife to support. 
It necessarily follows, therefore, that natural justice and 
fundamental social principles are advanced and secured by 
the policy declared in section 139 of our Civil Code and any 
law to the contrary is a violation of the public policy in-
volved in the doctrine of comity and should not be counte-
nanced by this court. There is no injustice caused to the . 
woman. When she marries the second time, she takes her --' 
new companion for better or worse, and chooses, and in 
justice should look to him and him alone for her maintenance. 
He should not be relieved from this obligation, nor be per-
mitted to live a life of ease and idleness at the expense of 
not only the efforts and toil of the first husband, but also at 
the much greater cost of making it economically impossible 
for the first husband to remarry. The decision cites Hand-
schy v. Handsclvy, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 504 [90 Pac. (2d) 123], 
for its position, but rather than supporting it, that decision 
unequivocally states that, it is against the public policy of 
California to enforce a divorce decree of a sister state which 
requires the payment of alimony after remarriage. In the 
cited case it is said at page 509: "Appellant contends also 
that as the children are of age the amount of alimony 
awarded was ipso facto reduced to the extent that the same 
provided for their maintenance, support, and that the trial 
court erred in refusing to allow him credit accordingly, al-
though no modification had been made of the decree of the 
illinois court. No authority is cited by appellant in support of 
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accrued installments of an nward for support and mainte-
nance for wife and minor children were cancelled, the wife 
having remarried and the children become of age, but in 
those cases it is clear that the remarriage of the wife was 
the principal factor considered by the court, it being held 
that to require a husband to pay for the support and main-
tenance of his divorced wife, following her remarriage to 
another, would in the absence of extraordinary conditions, 
violate a sound principle of law and be against recognized 
public policy. (Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 661 r45 
Pac. (2d) 246] j Atlass v. Atlass, 112 Cal. App. 514 [297 
Pac. 53].)" 
Here the children are of age, and it certainly would do 
violence to the policy of our state founded on natural justice 
and basic social principles to permit the establishment of the 
Missouri decree requiring appellant to make payments to 
the wife in the future. The portion of the judgment of the 
trial court so declaring should be reversed. 
[L. A. No. 17588. In Bank.-January 29, 1941.] 
JOHN E. STALEY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Attorneys at Law-Right to Practice and Admission to Bar-
Procedure for Admission-Review of Examination-Petition. 
A petition in a mandamus proceeding by an unsuccessful ap-
plicant for admission to the bar is insufficient where it makes 
no charge of fraud, imposition or coercion, and does not assert 
a denial of a fair opportunity to take the examination, but 
amounts to nothing more than a statement of petitioner's 
general qualifications, and a statement that his answers en-
title him to a passing grade notwithstanding the grade given 
his papers by the Committee of Bar Examiners. The peti. 
tioner must show wherein the determination of the board was 
incorrect or unfair. And the court will not assume from 
the statement of petitioner's qualifications that it was im~ 
possible for him to receive the grades given by the committee. 
1. See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 362. 
McK. Dig. References: L Attorneys at Law, § 19. 
